Non-monotonic bargaining, bargaining with argumentation

Participants:

• Pinata Winoto, PhD Student
• Gord McCalla (co-supervisor)
• Julita Vassileva (co-supervisor)

The standard bargaining protocol of offers and counter-offers can be extended to include strategic delay, argumentation and non-monotionic offers.

• Winoto P., McCalla G, Vassileva J. (2005) Non-Monotonic-Offers Bargaining Protocol. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems11 (1): 45-67 (July 2005).
• Winoto P., McCalla G. and Vassileva J. (2004) Non-Monotonic-Offers Bargaining Protocol, to appear in Proceedings of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS'04) Conference, New York, July 21-25, 2004, 1072 - 1079. (full paper, 24.6% acceptance rate, ** BEST STUDENT PAPER AWARD **).
• Pinata Winoto, Gordon McCalla & Julita Vassileva. An Extended Alternating-Offers Bargaining Protocol for Automated Negotiation in Multi-Agent Systems. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cooperative Information Systems (CoopIS'2002), Irvine, CA, November, 2002. Springer LNCS vol. 2519, 179-194.
• Pinata Winoto, Gordon McCalla & Julita Vassileva. An Extended Alternating-Offers Bargaining Protocol for Automated Negotiation in Multi-Agent Systems. (student abstract). In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2002), Edmonton, Canada, July 28-August 1, 2002. 969-970.

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Bilateral Negotiation with Modelling the Opponent

Participants:

• Chhaya Mudgal, MSc Student (completed in March 2000)
• Julita Vassileva (co-supervisor)

A novel approach to automated negotiation for self-interested agents negotiating on behalf of their users. Negotiation is considered a decision making problem for the agent where he has to evaluate the utility of three options: to accept the proposal of the opponent, to reject it, or to couter-propose it with a certain new price. Do deal with the uncertainty in the opponent's reaction, the agent builds and utilizes a model of the opponent. The evaluation of the proposed approach showed the advantages of modeling the opponent in negotiation.

• Vassileva, J. and Mudgal, C. (2002) Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information: Trading Help in a Distributed Peer Help Environment, Chapter 16, in Parsons S., Gmytrasiewicz P., Wooldridge M. (eds.) Game-Theoretic and Decision-Theoretic Agents, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 337-354.
• C. Mudgal, J. Vassileva (2000) Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information, in CIA'2000, in Klusch & Kershberg (eds.) Proceedings of the Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, Springer LNAI 1860, pp.107-118.
• C. Mudgal, J. Vassileva (2000) An influence diagram model for multi-agent negotiation, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems ICMAS'2000. Boston, July 2000, pp. 451-453.
• C. Mudgal, J. Vassileva (2000) Multi-agent negotiation to support an economy for online help and tutoring, in Proceedings of ITS'2000, Springer LNCS 1839, 83-92.
• Mudgal, C. & Vassileva, J. (1999) Negotiation among Agents in a Multi-Agent Environment Supporting Peer-Help: a Decision-Theoretic Approach. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Agents for Electronic Commerce and Managing the Internet-Enabled Supply Chain.